08 octobre 2009
Le protocole US ... un accord de crise ?
Il y a quelques semaines, nous annoncions la signature d'un accord entre
l'administration Obama et le syndicat des contrôleurs américains NATCA.
Le Wall Street Journal a révélé quelques unes des mesures sociales
obtenues par nos collègues. Ainsi le coût total de l'accord serait de
669 millions de $ qui se déclinerait dans des augmentations de salaires
sur 3 ans :
- De 142.100$ en 2009 vers 157.900$ annuel en 2012 pour un contrôleur totalement qualifié (#13.000$ par mois)
- Un gain encore plus important pour les jeunes contrôleurs estimé à 27.358$ par an sur la durée du protocole
Le moins que l'on puisse dire c'est que ce n'est pas une mauvaise négo par les temps qui courent !
La presse républicaine l'a d'ailleurs un peu en trvers de la gorge et ne se gène pas pour l'exprimer : "When you realize that lavish government employee benefits typically add 40% or more to cash salaries, the average air traffic controller is earning a substantial multiple of the average American income. Not bad for a job which requires a bachelor's degree. "
Quand les systèmes sont développés sans l'expertise des contrôleurs ...
Alors qu'elle développe son nouveau système de contrôle NextGen, la FAA vient de subir un sévère revers le week end dernier à l'ACC de Salt Lake City. Une conséquence probable de l'ère Bush pendant laquelle les contrôleurs ont été bafoué dans leur expertise opérationnelle.
Le système appelé En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) qui devait être basculé en opérationnel à Salt Lake est le cœur du futur NextGen. Il est de surcroit absolument nécessaire qu'il soit mis en service partout d'ici fin 2010 date à laquelle le contrat de maintenance du système actuel expire !
La tentative de basculement a donc eu lieu à Salt Lake pendant la nuit. Il n'a malheureusement pas supporté la montée du trafic et a été arrêté environ 9h plus tard après avoir commis des erreurs de corrélation: un COA qui venait de décoller de KSLC a été corrélé comme étant un Skywest qui venait de se poser ... les types d'appareils étaient même différents !
Les techniciens ne savent pas la raison de ses confusions qui se seraient apparues lors d'autres tests. Le NATCA pour sa part se félicite que l'encadrement local ait refusé de faire un nouveau test live le lendemain et rappelle que les contrôleurs qu'il représente ont été exclu du développement de ce système, qu'ils n'ont donc pas pu apporter leur expertise lors du débugage et que le niveau de confiance dans ce nouvel outil est donc proche de zéro !
30 août 2009
Pendant ce temps là, à Oakland ...
Pendant ce temps là, à Oakland, le centre de contrôle à perdu tout son système de communication pendant 20 min : les contrôleurs ont assuré la sécurité en utilisant leurs téléphones portables personnels pour joindre leurs collègues des centres adjacents.
A
subcontractor’s mistake caused the FAA Telecommunications
Infrastructure (FTI) system to shut down Wednesday morning for 20
harrowing minutes at one of the country’s largest regional air traffic
control centers, leaving more than half the controllers on duty without
the ability to communicate with airborne aircraft or use landline
telephones to communicate with other air traffic control facilities.
Controllers
at Oakland Center were forced to contact surrounding FAA facilities
with their personal cell phones and coordinate instructions to aircraft
that were relayed by these facilities over the emergency radio
frequencies. Oakland Center is responsible for a huge swath of airspace
encompassing most of the northern half of California and parts of
western Nevada, in addition to many millions of miles of airspace over
the Pacific Ocean.
Today, 48 hours after the communications outage, air traffic controllers are asking these important questions:
- Why has the FAA put the maintenance work for this critical communications system in the hands of a series of subcontractors, instead of having FAA employees do the work?
- Why weren’t air traffic controllers told on Tuesday of the maintenance work and the fact that redundancy in the system was on its very last thread, thereby making it imperative that the facility be put on some type of alert status?
- What level of confidence should controllers have in the work of these subcontractors that so directly impacts the safety of the flying public?
The
outage lasted from approximately 8 a.m. PDT to 8:30 a.m. PDT Wednesday.
No further outages have been reported since that time.
The
problem appears to have begun on Tuesday, when the subcontractors
performing maintenance on the telephone and communication lines noticed
a problem. The system was put on a backup line, but there was no
notification given to air traffic controllers whatsoever that this was
happening and no indication provided that controllers should be on
alert should the system shut down.
Earlier
Wednesday, during troubleshooting of the FTI lines, redundancies built
into the backup system went down, leaving only half of the facility
with radios and landline communications with other facilities. In
addition, the terminal radar approach control facilities that interact
with both Oakland Center and airport tower controllers did not get the
data they needed to keep traffic moving efficiently.
Toute ressemblance avec des faits ayant conduit à une collision en vol en Europe est évidement purement fortuite !
28 août 2009
Collision de l'Hudson: Recommandations du NTSB
En guise de follow up au feuilleton de l'été, voici les premières recommandations du NTSB ... c'est très facile à lire et assez instructif sur l'organisation de la circulation aérienne à New York. La version pdf est en ligne.
On notera toutefois que le BEA américain continue de charger les contrôleurs de KTEB à la fois sur un point règlementaire vis à vis de l'information de vol (la notion de service rendu en fonction de la charge de travail est aussi un débat bien connu chez nous) mais aussi et probablement surtout pour un comportement qualifié de peu professionnel.
Extraits
"After the initial postdeparture traffic call, ATC did not advise the accident airplane pilot of potential conflicts with other aircraft ahead in the Hudson River class B exclusion area. Because the first radar target for the accident helicopter was detected about 1152:27, the helicopter was not yet visible on radar when the TEB local controller issued the frequency change to the airplane’s pilot. Therefore, before the frequency change, the TEB local controller could not have detected the impending conflict between the accident airplane and the accident helicopter or issued a warning to the airplane pilot about the helicopter. However, radar detected other aircraft in the Hudson River class B exclusion area that were potential conflicts at that time. The TEB local controller did not advise the airplane pilot of the other traffic ahead. The pilot of the airplane had requested radar traffic advisories before departure, and was advised of "radar contact" by TEB after departure, indicating that, workload permitting, the service was being provided. According to FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, providing traffic advisories to VFR aircraft is an additional service that, as the FAA order states, “is required when the work situation permits.” The TEB local controller's ATC workload was light at the time of the frequency change, so it appears that nothing should have prevented him from providing the service. The EWR tower controller observed the existing traffic in the Hudson River class B exclusion area and called the TEB local controller to ask that he instruct the airplane pilot to turn toward the southwest to resolve the situation. The call overlapped the pilot’s acknowledgment of the radio frequency change instruction from the TEB local controller. The TEB controller did not hear the EWR controller’s instruction clearly and requested that it be repeated. The TEB controller then attempted to contact the airplane, but the pilot did not respond, likely because he had already changed frequencies. The collision occurred about 1 minute after the frequency change and 26 seconds after the TEB local controller's last attempt to contact the pilot."
Le NTSB suggère ici clairement que certes le contrôleur ne pouvait pas faire l'info d'un hélico qu'il ne voyait pas mais que puisqu'il na pas fait l'info de ceux qu'il voyait, il ne l'aurait pas fait non plus pour l'hélico s'il l'avait vu !!!
"The NTSB is concerned with the complacency and inattention to duty evidenced by the actions of the TEB local controller and the supervisor during the events surrounding this accident. The local controller initiated a telephone conversation unrelated to his work about 1150:31, about 2 minutes after he cleared the accident airplane for takeoff. The conversation continued until 1153:13, with the local controller dividing his attention between the telephone conversation and his ATC tasks. The controller was not fully engaged in his duties.
Following the accident, the TEB controller attempted to locate the ATC supervisor on duty, who had left the tower cab for a break, to tell him what had occurred. The supervisor could not be found in the building. The controller attempted to contact the supervisor by cell phone, but there was no response. The supervisor later stated that he had left the premises to run a personal errand. He did not tell the local controller, who was the controller-in-charge in the absence of the supervisor, that he would be leaving the facility. This adversely affected the mandatory and time critical accident notification and reporting process. The supervisor's unannounced absence is also of concern because of the local controller’s inappropriate telephone conversation that likely would not have been permitted if the supervisor had been on duty in the tower cab.
Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA brief all air traffic controllers and supervisors on the ATC performance deficiencies evident in the circumstances of this accident and emphasize the requirement to be attentive and conscientious when performing ATC duties."
Cela a bien sûr induit une réaction immédiate du NATCA :"The NTSB again has rushed to wrongly blame the air traffic controller
in this incident. The board inexplicably has also made its
recommendations before the FAA task force examining these issues --
which NATCA is participating on - has done its job to make what is
already an incredibly safe airspace even safer. The task force is due
to release its report next week. So why the rush? But the bottom line
here is that the controller is not responsible for contributing to this
tragic accident and he did everything he could do. We cannot provide
traffic advisories to aircraft we are not talking to, cannot see on
radar or are not a factor at all."
21 août 2009
Collision de l'Hudson : controverse et lynchage médiatique
Aux USA, les média se déchainent en cette fin d'été à propos de la collision entre un avion de tourisme et un hélicoptère au dessus de l'Hudson.
Les faits rapportés par le NTSB
"On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA (N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R- 300 (N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The certificated commercial pilot and five passengers onboard the helicopter were killed. The certificated private pilot and two passengers onboard the airplane were also killed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plans were filed for either flight.
The helicopter departed West 30th Street Heliport (JRA), New York, for a sightseeing tour at 11:52 a.m. The airplane departed Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, at 11:49 a.m.; destined for Ocean City Municipal Airport (26N), Ocean City, New Jersey. The airplane pilot requested an en route altitude of 3500 feet.
According to preliminary radar data, the helicopter turned south from JRA and climbed to 1,100 feet, with a transponder code of 1200. According to witnesses, the pilot of the helicopter had transmitted a position report of "Stevens Point" (Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey) on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), 123.05.
On the day of the accident, Teterboro Air Traffic Control Tower staff consisted of five controllers. At the time of the accident, the tower was staffed with two controllers: one controller was working ground control, local control, and arrival radar, and was also acting as the controller in charge of the facility. The second controller was working the flight data/clearance delivery position. Two other controllers were on break and the front line manager had left the facility at about 1145.
At 1148:30, the Teterboro tower controller cleared the airplane for takeoff on frequency 119.50. The first radar target for the airplane was recorded at 1149:55 as the flight departed runway 19.
The tower controller advised the airplane and the pilot of another helicopter operating in the area of each other and instructed the pilot of the airplane to remain at or below 1,100 feet. At this time, the tower controller initiated a non-business-related phone call to Teterboro Airport Operations. The airplane flew southbound until the controller instructed its pilot to turn left to join the Hudson River. At 1152:20 the Teterboro controller instructed the pilot to contact Newark on a frequency of 127.85; the airplane reached the Hudson River just north of Hoboken about 40 seconds later. At that time there were several aircraft detected by radar in the area immediately ahead of the airplane, including the accident helicopter, all of which were potential traffic conflicts for the airplane. The Teterboro tower controller, who was engaged in a phone call at the time, did not advise the pilot of the potential traffic conflicts. The Newark tower controller observed air traffic over the Hudson River and called Teterboro to ask that the controller instruct the pilot of the airplane to turn toward the southwest to resolve the potential conflicts. The Teterboro controller then attempted to contact the airplane but the pilot did not respond. The collision occurred shortly thereafter. A review of recorded air traffic control communications showed that the pilot did not call Newark before the accident occurred.
The helicopter departed from the 30th Street Heliport at 1152 for what was planned to be a 12-minute tour. The initial part of the tour was to be flown outside class B airspace, so the pilot was not required to contact air traffic control before or after departure. The first radar target for the helicopter was detected by Newark radar at about 1152:27, when the helicopter was approximately mid- river west of the heliport and climbing through 400 feet. According to recorded radar data, the helicopter flew to the west side of the river, and then turned southbound to follow the Hudson. According to Liberty Helicopters management, this was the expected path for the tour flight. The helicopter continued climbing southbound until 1153:14, when it and the airplane collided at 1,100 feet.
As noted above, immediately after the Teterboro tower controller instructed the airplane to contact Newark tower on frequency 127.85, the Newark controller called the Teterboro controller to request that they turn the airplane to a heading of 220 degrees (southwest) and transfer communications on the aircraft. As the Newark controller was providing the suggested heading to the Teterboro controller, the pilot of the airplane was acknowledging the frequency change to the Teterboro controller. The Teterboro controller made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the pilot, with the second attempt occurring at 1152:50. At 1152:54, 20 seconds prior to the collision, the radar data processing system detected a conflict between the airplane and the helicopter, which set off aural alarms and a caused a "conflict alert" indication to appear on the radar displays at both Teterboro and Newark towers. During interviews both controllers stated that they did not recall seeing or hearing the conflict alert. At 1153:19, five seconds after the collision, the Teterboro controller contacted the Newark controller to ask about the airplane, and was told that the pilot had not called. There were no further air traffic control contacts with either aircraft. The role that air traffic control might have played in this accident will be determined by the NTSB as the investigation progresses. Any opinions rendered at this time are speculative and premature.
The recorded weather at TEB at 1151 was wind variable at 3 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 24 degrees Celsius, dew point 7 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.23 inches of mercury."
Le contrôleur en poste ainsi que son superviseur qui s'était absenté du bâtiment ont été immédiatement suspendu sans toutefois d'impact salarial.
Immédiatement, la presse s'empare de l'affaire et disserte de ce fameux coup de téléphone non professionnel à UNE employée de l'aéroport. A ce stade l'anonymat des contrôleurs est encore préservé. Le NATCA de son coté est très choqué des approximations inhabituelles du communiqué du NTSB ... il va réagir.
Réaction du NATCA pointant les incohérence du NTSB
NATCA STRONGLY DISPUTES NTSB INFERENCE OF CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITY IN HUDSON RIVER CRASH SEQUENCE
"Air traffic controllers today are strongly disputing
misleading and – in one passage – outright false parts of Friday’s NTSB
Hudson River mid-air crash press release that mistakenly and unfairly
assign responsibilities to a Teterboro, N.J., controller during the
pre-crash sequence of events that simply did not exist.
At issue are four words in the NTSB press release that wrongly infer
that the Teterboro controller could have warned the pilot of the Piper
aircraft about the helicopter over the Hudson River that the aircraft
eventually hit. The press release infers that at the time the Teterboro
controller told the aircraft to switch his frequency to talk to Newark
Tower controllers, there were several aircraft detected by radar in the
area immediately ahead of the airplane, “including the accident
helicopter.” NATCA emphatically declares that these four words are
absolutely false and have contributed to the reckless and mistaken
conclusion that the Teterboro controller could have prevented this
crash.
The same NTSB press release clearly states that the helicopter did not
show on radar until 1152.27, seven seconds after communication with the
aircraft was switched from Teterboro to Newark at 1152.20. But the
poorly written and misleading passage about the “accident helicopter”
has left the mistaken impression that the Teterboro controller was
responsible for not warning the aircraft about that traffic.
Furthermore, and equally disturbing, the NTSB privately
revealed to NATCA officials over the weekend that it knows that the
four words in question in its press release are “misleading and
inappropriate.” A high-ranking NTSB official stated in an e-mail that
the wording “could have been clearer” but that a correction “will not
be issued.”
“We believe the NTSB is wrong to infer there was a traffic
advisory that could have been issued from Teterboro Tower to the
aircraft,” said Ray Adams, NATCA Facility Representative at Newark
Tower who is representing the Teterboro Tower controller in the NTSB
crash investigation. “The helicopter was not depicted on the radar
prior to the switch of control from Teterboro to Newark Tower.
Teterboro had no opportunity to call that traffic. The service of air
traffic control is based on "known and observed" traffic. The Teterboro
controller had neither seen nor known about the accident helicopter at
the transfer of communication to Newark.
“Also, let’s remember that the aircraft never made radio
contact with Newark, as Teterboro had requested. Nobody was talking to
him. You cannot issue traffic warnings to a pilot who is not
communicating with you. You have to reach the pilot first and the
Teterboro controller – as is accurately made clear in the NTSB press
release– tried twice, to no avail.”
Added NATCA President Patrick Forrey: “Let me make this as
clear as I can: our air traffic controller at Teterboro did his job. We
believe he is not responsible for contributing to this tragic accident
and there is nothing he could have done to prevent it from happening.
We respect the NTSB and we value our participation in NTSB
investigations. But in this case, the NTSB has completely ignored our
input, painted an unrealistic view of the job description of a
Teterboro controller and fueled a public feeding frenzy that unfairly
blames this particular Teterboro controller for not acting to stop the
sequence of events that led to the crash.
“We respectfully ask that the NTSB immediately act to stop
this rush to judgment that this controller had anything to do with the
crash until the Board’s full investigation is complete. An immediate
correction of the flawed press release would be an appropriate first
step.”"
Alors certes, le NTSB et la FAA ont convenu que le NATCA avait raison sur les faits mais l'ont éjecté de l'enquête pour avoir rompu la clause de confidentialité. Aux USA en effet, le syndicat des contrôleurs est observateur des enquêtes et à accès au dossier bien avant qu'il soit rendu public, la contrepartie est qu'il doit en respecter la confidentialité en particulier vis à vis des médias.
Visiblement d'autres sources proche de l'enquête mais qui savent rester anonymes continuent d'alimenter la presse avec des documents sensibles, l'identité des contrôleurs impliqués ainsi que des transcripts des conversations ...
Ce qui a motivé l'appel du contrôleur à l'employée de l'aéroport est apparament le fait que cette dernière avait du aller chercher un chat mort sur le tarmac d'où un échange certes peu professionnel mais néanmoins bien innocent.
La transcription qui suit est issue de la presse, elle n'y a aucune confirmation officielle.
"11:48:46 a.m. the Teterboro controller contacts a helicopter in the
area to report that a plane is taking off and "will be turning to the
southeast, join the river, climbing to 1,100 (feet)." The controller
asks the Piper, tail number N71MC, to report its altitude.
11:50:05 a.m. Piper pilot: "Climbing out of four hundred."
Teterboro controller: "Traffic 11 o'clock and two miles, northwest bound one thousand (feet), a helicopter."
Piper pilot: "Seven one mike charlie, lookin'."
At that point, the helicopter pilot reports the Piper is in sight, and the Teterboro controller tells the Piper, "helicopter has you in sight."
Piper pilot: "Thank you, sir."
11:50:41 a.m. the Teterboro controller gets on the phone with a woman from the airport's operations center. "Do we have plenty of gas for the grill?" he asks.
Operations: "Huh?"
Controller: "I said, we got plenty of gas in the grill?
Operations: "(unintelligible) it kinda sucks that we can't, we won't be able to do it today."
Controller: "(unintelligible) fire up the cat."
Operations: "Ooh, disgusting. Augh, that thing was disgusting."
Controller: "Chinese people do it, so why can't we?"
Operations: "Augh, stop it."
Controller: (laughter).
11:51:17 a.m. Controller, to the Piper pilot: "One mike charlie, start a left turn to join the Hudson River."
Piper pilot: "One mike charlie."
Controller: "This freakin' guy"
Operations: "I know (laughter).
Controller: (unintelligible)
Operations: "Oh my god, it was pretty bad. Ugh."
The conversation continues for about 2½ minutes, interspersed with radio communications with various aircraft.
11:52:19 a.m. the controller radios the Piper and instructs the pilot to contact the Newark airport tower on a certain frequency, and the pilot repeats the instruction. At about the same time, the Newark tower calls the Teterboro tower about the Piper plane.
Newark controller: "Hey, Teterboro, Newark. Would you switch that guy, maybe put him on a two-twenty heading to get away from that other traffic please?
Teterboro controller: "Say again, Newark."
Newark controller: "Can you switch that PA-32 (the Piper)?"
Teterboro controller: "I ... did keep an eye on him, though."
Newark controller: "I'm not talking to him, so..."
Teterboro controller, trying to radio the Piper: "One mike charlie, Newark is (on frequency) twenty-seven eighty-five. He's lost in the hertz, try him again."
Newark controller: "One mike charlie, Newark."
During this time, the Teterboro controller is also on the phone with the woman in the operations office.
11:53:07 a.m., Teterboro controller says to the operations office: "Damn."
Operations: "What's the matter..."
Controller: "Yeah, let me straighten stuff out." He hangs up at 11:53:10, four seconds before the collision occurs.
Teterboro controller, on the radio to Newark: "Newark, Teterboro. Did you get him yet?"
Newark controller: "Nope."
11:55:17, Newark controller: "I think he went down in the Hudson."
11:55:42, another helicopter pilot in the area: "Be advised there was an airplane crashed into a helicopter just south of the Lincoln (tunnel) a minute ago.
Teterboro operations: "Did he say what I thought he said?"
Controller: "Yeah."
Operations: "Where at?"
Controller: "Over the river."
Operations: "Oh, my lord. Okay, thanks.""
De leur coté, la FAA et le NATCA semblent revenus sur une ligne plus proche. La FAA déclare en effet que "the controller's actions were inappropriate and unacceptable, but didn't appear to have contributed to the accident." ce qui ne plait pas trop au NTSB qui rappelle que c'est à lui de déterminer quel a été le rôle de chacun dans cet accident. Le NATCA confirmant pour sa part que "This phone call and the FAA's allegations that it was inappropriate are something that will handled by the FAA in a disciplinary matter we will be involved in, but the bottom line for us is that this call had nothing to do with this tragic accident that occurred"
17 août 2009
Aux USA, le NATCA signe son protocole ...
Alors que nos collègues américains travaillent depuis 3 ans sous un contrat qui leur a été imposé par la FAA Bushienne, l'administration Obama apaise le lien social et tend la main aux contrôleurs.
Après avoir eu recours à un médiateur, les deux parties ont en effet conclu un accord qui attend maintenant d'être ratifié par les membres du NATCA. L'administration Obama avait en effet reconnu que la situation qui perdurait avait finie par impacter la sécurité et l'efficacité du système.
Les membres du NATCA ont 45 jours pour ratifier l'accord sur des points mineurs, les grands sujet tels que les salaires ne faisant pas l'objet du débat.
Les avancées pour les contrôleurs sur cet accord de 3 ans sont les suivantes:
- Plus de flexibilité dans le choix de leurs horaires
- aide à la garde d'enfants
- mécanisme incitatif pour une mutattion sur des centres peu attractifs
- grille salariale bénéficiant aux jeunes comme aux plus anciens
Les deux parties semblent satisfaites de cet accord et annoncent pouvoir maintenant se consacrer pleinement à la mise en œuvre de NextGen.
24 mars 2009
New NATCA Ad to promote Safety
J'ai toujours eu un petit faible pour la communication de nos collègues américains ...
Every flight, every day, we guide you home !
24 novembre 2008
Aux USA on prépare le rush de Thanksgiving ...
Pour faire face à
l’explosion du trafic lors du week-end de Thanksgiving, l'administration américaine en fin de mandat prend le taureau par les cornes et va autoriser le survol des zones militaires. Cette mesure déjà utilisé l'année dernière à la même occasion, va être étendue. C'est une bonne idée non ?
Par ailleurs, trois nouvelles pistes ont été inaugurés à Washington, Seattle et Chicago. Mais Bush a surtout signé un ordre
exécutif la mise en place de NextGen, le nouveau
système de contrôle du trafic aérien dont le principal atout sera
l’utilisation de la navigation par satellite.
Du coté du NATCA, on met beaucoup d'espoir dans la future administration Obama quant à une participation accrue des contrôleurs dans le développement des nouveaux outils et de la politique du transport aérien. En particulier, le syndicat insite sur le fait que NextGen c'est bien mais qu'il ne faudrait pas oublier le NowGen et aussi penser à réparer le système actuel défaillant.
L'exemple de l'ATOP est interressant :
"Standing for Advanced Technologies for Oceanic Procedures, this
computer system predicts where aircraft will be at any given moment
while flying over the ocean where there is no radar coverage. The
system is supposed to allow controllers to know when to safely give
altitude and route changes, however there are major flaws in how the
reports are conveyed.
The reports given are essentially a computer-driven long distance phone
call from the aircraft (through a service provider) to the ATOP
computer. Because the airlines are charged for each message transmitted
they were allowed to negotiate the frequency required to make these
reports. Compromising safety for money, these reports can be as far as
27 minutes apart and during that period of time the computer is
guessing what the actual position of the aircraft is. In many cases
controllers give aircraft clearances that the computer has said are
safe and are then told seconds later that they are not – leaving the
controller scrambling to re-establish a safe amount of separation
between aircraft.
When the system fails it is the controller who is punished for the fact that aircraft came too close to one another."
05 novembre 2008
Ambiance délétaire qu'ils disaient ...
A Kansas City controller, wrongfully suspended after an FAA supervisor initiated a physical altercation with him on the job, was fully exonerated with the help of the Department of Labor.
In a minor disagreement that quickly escalated, the controller’s FAA supervisor shoved him after the controller disagreed with him. After filing a police report with the airport authorities the controller was issued a three-day suspension by the FAA.
Now, more than a year after and an action by NATCA, the controller has been completely exonerated of any wrongdoing.
Possibly the biggest offense made by the FAA against the accused controller was its negligence in informing him of his suspension in the first place : leaving him to hear about it on a local TV news channel.
19 octobre 2008
Fais voir un peu ce qu'il a dans le ventre ...
Federal aviation officials are investigating whether FAA supervisor violated federal rules by rerouting four airliners to test
the skills of a controller-trainee.
The aircrafts were rerouted inland on orders from a supervisor at an ACC in Florida who wanted to test the skills of a trainee.
"In my 20 years as an air traffic controller we had never done anything like what they just did. To do this with live traffic, airliners that are full of passengers, well, it's reckless. It's beyond reckless" said a NATCA representative.
The planes were directed at least 60-70 miles out of their way into an area of airspace known as the "Alma sector," where there were storms Saturday. The pilots would have had to "zigzag" to avoid the storms, adding more extra miles to their trip.
Besides rerouting the flights, the supervisor also ordered a veteran controller to leave the four flights "stacked" at varying altitudes above 30,000 feet rather than bringing them all down to 30,000 feet and stringing them out in a line, as would be the normal practice before reaching the Alma sector. The supervisor told controllers he wanted to leave the planes stacked so the trainee could practice unstacking them.
Moreover, the supervisor also ordered a veteran controller to tell one of the four pilots to report an incorrect altitude to see whether the trainee would catch the mistake.
